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INTRODUCTION 
“Ground zero” for sex and labor trafficking.1 A “hotbed” for sex 
trafficking activity.2 This is not what one would normally think of 
when referring to hotel establishments across the country. However, 
media stories, reports, and lawsuits are increasingly exposing this 
alarming reality about our nation’s hotels.3 Many children, women, 
and men are being forced into sex trafficking at hotels and lodging 
establishments across the country.4 In response to this disheartening 
reality, a number of states have passed laws that currently allow for 
victims to hold hotels civilly liable for sex trafficking under a 
“facilitator” or “beneficiary” liability theory.5 These state statutes are 
modeled after § 1595 of the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims 
Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 (TVPRA),6 which provides 
for civil liability for “whoever knowingly benefits, financially or by 
receiving anything of value from participation in a venture which that 
person knew or should have known has engaged in [sex trafficking].”7 
Additionally, many states have enacted laws that mandate that anti-
trafficking training and protocols be implemented at hotels and motels 
 
 1. Michael Joe Murphy, Hotel-Motel Sex Trafficking—Florida Is Ripe for a Crackdown, 
ORLANDO SENTINEL (Feb. 8, 2018), https://www.orlandosentinel.com/opinion/os-fla-motel-hotel-
human-trafficking-crackdown-bills-20180208-story.html. 
 2. Monika, Sleep Tight: What Hotels Are Doing to Fight Human Trafficking, 
INTERNATIONELLE (Jan. 12, 2018), http://www.internationelle.org/hotels-against-trafficking/ 
(“Labor trafficking, sex trafficking . . . human trafficking. All of which can be found in the hotel 
industry. In an industry worth over $150 billion, it's no surprise that the anonymity of hotels 
provides a hotbed . . . of trafficking activity.” (first omission in original)); Plaintiff’s Original 
Petition at 56, Jane Doe #1 v. Backpage.com, No. 2018-04501 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Jan. 23, 2018) (“In a 
recent Blue Campaign bulletin, the Department of Homeland Security outlines that traffickers have 
long used the hotel industry as a hotbed for human trafficking and has recommended policies and 
procedures that the industry can take to help prevent human trafficking and the sexual exploitation 
of minors.”). 
 3. See sources cited supra note 2. 
 4. See Hotline Statistics, NAT’L HUM. TRAFFICKING HOTLINE, 
https://humantraffickinghotline.org/states (last visited Feb. 21, 2021) (data current through Dec. 31, 
2019). 
 5. See Lori Nazry Ross, See No Evil: A Look at Florida’s Legislative Response to Holding 
Hotels Civilly Liable for “Turning a Blind Eye” to the Sex Trafficking Monster Hiding Behind 
Closed Doors, 22 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 375, 390–99 (2020); see, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. 
STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3051(a)(2)(i) (West, Westlaw through 2020 Reg. Sess. Act 95); 
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 98.002 (West, Westlaw through the end of the 2019 Reg. 
Sess. of the 86th Leg.); ALA. CODE § 13A-6-157 (West, Westlaw through Act 2020-206). 
 6. William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. L. 
No. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044 (codified as amended in various sections of 6 U.S.C, 8 U.S.C., 18 
U.S.C., 22 U.S.C, and 42 U.S.C.). 
 7. 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a) (2018); see Ross, supra note 5, at 390. 
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for their employees.8 As a result of the federal and state statutes 
allowing for civil liability against hotels under a “beneficiary liability” 
theory, there has been a surge in the United States of beneficiary 
liability lawsuits being filed by sex trafficking victims against hotels.9 
As the number of these types of suits has rapidly increased in the last 
few years, with a particular uptick in 2019,10 there has also been an 
increase in related declaratory judgment actions being brought by 
insurers against their hotel insureds.11 These insurers are asking 
courts to find that the insurer does not have a duty to defend or 
indemnify in the underlying sex trafficking beneficiary liability 
suits based on certain policy exclusions.12 Recently, the Third 
Circuit Court of Appeals, in Nautilus Insurance Co. v. Motel 
Management Services, Inc.,13 affirmed a 2018 decision by a 
Pennsylvania federal district court ruling that the assault and battery 
exclusion at issue in the case barred coverage for the claims in the 
underlying sex trafficking beneficiary liability action against the 
 
 8. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a-106g (West, Westlaw through the 2020 Reg. Sess., the 
2020 July Spec. Sess., and the 2020 Sept. Spec. Sess.); MINN. STAT. § 157.177 (West, Westlaw 
from the 2020 Reg. Sess. and 1st through 7th Spec. Sess.); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12950.3 (Deering 
2021); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 206-f (McKinney, Westlaw through L. 2020, ch. 1 to 387); FLA. 
STAT. ANN. § 509.096(1)(a) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 184 of the 2020 2d Reg. Sess. of the 26th 
Leg.). 
 9. Corinne Ramey, Lawsuits Accuse Big Hotel Chains of Allowing Sex Trafficking, WALL 
ST. J. (Mar. 4, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/lawsuits-accuse-big-hotel-chains-of-allowing-
sex-trafficking-11583317800; see, e.g., Complaint, M.B. v. Roosevelt Inn LLC, No. 170300712 
(Pa. Ct. C.P. Mar. 10, 2017); Plaintiff’s Original Petition, Jane Doe #1 v. Backpage.com, No. 2018-
04501 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Jan. 23, 2018); Notice of Removal, K.R. v. Backpage.com, No. 1:17-cv-
00299 (M.D. Ala. May 5, 2017); Complaint, M.A. v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc., 425 F. 
Supp. 3d 959 (S.D. Ohio 2019) (No. 2:19-cv-00849); Complaint, H.H. v. G6 Hosp. LLC, No. 2:19-
cv-00755 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 3, 2019); Complaint, B.M. v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc., No. 
5:20-cv-00656 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2020); Complaint, J.L. v. Best Western Int’l, Inc., No. 1:19-cv-
03713 (D. Colo. Dec. 30, 2019). 
 10. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 9. 
 11. See Emily Adams & Shubhra Mashelkar, Human Trafficking Lawsuits and the Hotel 
Industry, HOTEL BUS. (Aug. 11, 2020), https://www.hotelbusiness.com/human-trafficking-
lawsuits-and-the-hotel-industry/#:~:text=In%202019%20alone%2C%20no%20less,in%20connect 
ion%20with%20human%20trafficking; see, e.g., Nautilus Ins. Co. v. Motel Mgmt. Servs., Inc. 
(Nautilus I), 320 F. Supp. 3d 636 (E.D. Pa. 2018), aff’d, 781 F. App’x. 57 (3d Cir. 2019); Ricchio 
v. Bijal, Inc. (Peerless), 424 F. Supp. 3d 182 (D. Mass. 2019); Complaint, Atain Specialty Ins. Co. 
v. Varahi Hotel, LLC, No. 1:20-cv-01582-WMR (N.D. Ga. Apr. 13, 2020) [hereinafter Atain 
Complaint]; Starr Indem. & Liab. Co. v. Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc., No. 1:20-cv-03172-PKC 
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 2020) [hereinafter Starr Complaint]. 
 12. Cf. Adams & Mashelkar, supra note 11 (as liability lawsuits continue to increase, it follows 
that there is also an increase in these hotels’ insurance companies filing declaratory judgements to 
avoid defending the hotels and to avoid being held liable). 
 13. 781 F. App’x. 57 (3d Cir. 2019). 
(9) 54.3_ROSS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/20/21  2:53 PM 
2021]  SEX TRAFFICKING IN THE HOTEL INDUSTRY 847 
hotel defendants, thus relinquishing the insurer’s duty to defend and 
indemnify the hotel insured.14 
Following Nautilus, in November of 2019, a federal district court 
in Massachusetts came to a different conclusion in Ricchio v. Bijal, 
Inc.15 (“Peerless”) holding that the insurer in that case did in fact have 
a duty to defend its hotel insured in the sex trafficking beneficiary 
liability lawsuit filed against the hotel by an alleged trafficking 
victim.16 The court reasoned that a “criminal acts” exclusion did not 
preclude the possibility of liability coverage.17 
Nautilus and Peerless appear to be the first two decisions 
addressing this critical coverage issue. Thus, an examination of these 
opinions, the arguments made by the parties, and the policy exclusions 
at issue may provide guidance as to how courts will handle this crucial 
issue moving forward. 
This Article posits that insurers, by way of their declaratory 
judgment actions, can serve as a regulator for hotels in the fight against 
sex trafficking. Insurance law scholars have argued that insurance 
companies are increasingly serving as “corporate regulators.”18 
Moreover, “insurance institutions act as risk regulators and regulate so 
many aspects of an . . . organization’s relationships in society.”19 
Accordingly, insurance companies can use their risk management 
tools to impact how a corporation complies with laws and heighten 
their commitment to corporate social responsibility.20 Exclusions to 
coverage are one type of risk management tool that can be used to 
incentivize corporations to reduce risks.21 In fact, some scholars have 
reasoned that risk management tools such as policy exclusions 
decrease “moral hazard”—the concept that an insured will relax the 
care he or she takes in safeguarding his or her property as a result of 
having insurance, because the insured knows that the loss will be 
 
 14. Id. at 61. 
 15. 424 F. Supp. 3d 182 (D. Mass. 2019). 
 16. Id. at 195. 
 17. See id. 
 18. Shauhin A. Talesh, Insurance Companies as Corporate Regulators: The Good, the Bad, 
and the Ugly, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 463, 465 (2017). 
 19. Id. 
 20. See id. at 466. 
 21. Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. Logue, Outsourcing Regulation: How Insurance Reduces 
Moral Hazard, 111 MICH. L. REV. 197, 199 (2012). 
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covered entirely or partly by the insurer.22 Exclusions allow the 
responsibility of particular policy losses to rest solely with insureds, 
which can lead to them stepping up their preventive efforts to reduce 
risks.23 It is my contention that the threat of hotels not being provided 
insurance coverage due to policy exclusions, and thus having to 
exclusively bear defense costs and potentially huge damage awards, 
will likely decrease the chance of moral hazard by hotels and motivate 
them to institute anti-trafficking preventative measures to end the 
grave reality of sex trafficking in the hotel environment. 
I have previously argued the importance of creating legal and 
financial repercussions for the hotel industry through exposure to 
sex trafficking beneficiary liability suits and how that exposure can 
serve as an incentive for hotels implementing anti-trafficking 
training measures to educate their workers on the warning indicia of 
trafficking and proper reporting procedures.24 
This Article builds on that argument and contends that just as 
litigation exposure for hotels facing actions by sex trafficking victims 
can serve as an impetus for corporate responsibility in helping to 
eliminate the evils of sex trafficking, so can the risk of not being 
provided a defense or indemnification by an insurer promote a sense 
of corporate responsibility amongst hotels, and ultimately prompt 
change. Even if courts ultimately find, however, that insurers have to 
defend and indemnify hotel insureds, insurers can still serve as 
regulators in the fight to end sex trafficking in the hotel industry by 
employing other risk management tools such as auditing, training, and 
educational services. 
Part I of this Article begins with an overview of the pervasiveness 
of sex trafficking at hotels, the federal Trafficking Victims Protection 
Act (TVPA),25 and the TVRPA. Part II discusses the emergence of 
recent sex trafficking beneficiary litigation against hotels under 18 
U.S.C. § 1595(a) of the TVPRA. Part III analyzes the role of the 
insurer as a regulator in the fight to end sex trafficking at hotels. Part 
 
 22. See id. at 199, 209 (acknowledging that insurance coverage can destroy incentives for care 
with insureds in certain circumstances and the use of exclusions can thwart this potential). 
 23. George L. Priest, A Principled Approach Toward Insurance Law: The Economics of 
Insurance and the Current Restatement Project, 24 GEO. MASON L. REV. 635, 648 (2017). 
 24. Ross, supra note 5, at 380. 
 25. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 
Stat. 1464 (codified as amended in various sections of 8 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 20 U.S.C., 22 U.S.C., 
27 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.). 
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IV proceeds by examining the ground-breaking Nautilus and Peerless 
decisions, the first of these declaratory judgment actions where courts 
have ruled on exclusions for coverage in sex trafficking beneficiary 
liability claims against hotels. This Part of the Article seeks to serve 
as an informative tool, providing guidance on the potential issues 
before courts hearing these actions and the stance that other courts may 
take in the future. Part IV concludes by discussing the rise of other 
declaratory judgment actions following Nautilus and Peerless, the 
implications that Nautilus and Peerless may have on other emerging 
declaratory actions, and the possibility of insurers using additional risk 
management tools to help end sex trafficking in the hotel industry. 
I.  SEX TRAFFICKING AND HOTELS, THE TVPA, AND TVPRA 
A.  An Overview of the Pervasiveness of Sex Trafficking at Hotels 
Within the first six months of 2019, the National Human 
Trafficking Hotline had received 3,266 reports of sex trafficking.26 
Sex and labor trafficking is reportedly a $150 billion criminal 
enterprise, with two-thirds of that estimated amount derived from sex 
trafficking.27 Unfortunately, hotels, motels, and other lodging 
establishments frequently become attractive venues for traffickers 
because of the anonymity and privacy that they provide.28 They are 
also attractive locales for traffickers to “house their operations” 
because they afford them the ability to pay in cash for hotel rooms and 
not have to maintain a separate building, with associated upkeep costs, 
for their criminal enterprises.29 
Over a ten-year period, ranging from 2007 to 2017, the National 
Human Trafficking Hotline received 3,596 reports of human 
trafficking cases involving hotels and motels.30 In fact, “[s]eventy-five 
 
 26. Hotline Statistics, supra note 4 (data as of June 31, 2019). 
 27. See ILO Says Forced Labour Generates Annual Profits of US$ 150 Billion, INT’L LAB. 
ORG. (May 20, 2014), http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/newsroom/news/WCMS_243201 
/lang—en/index.htm. 
 28. Human Trafficking and the Hospitality Industry, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
https://www.dhs.gov/blue-campaign/hospitalityindustry (last visited Feb. 21, 2021). 
 29. Ross, supra note 5, at 385. 
 30. BRITTANY ANTHONY ET AL., POLARIS, ON-RAMPS, INTERSECTIONS, AND EXIT ROUTES: 
A ROADMAP FOR SYSTEMS AND INDUSTRIES TO PREVENT AND DISRUPT HUMAN TRAFFICKING 67 
(2018), https://polarisproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/A-Roadmap-for-Systems-and-Indu 
stries-to-Prevent-and-Disrupt-Human-Trafficking.pdf. 
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percent of human trafficking victims reported that they had come into 
contact with a hotel at some point while being trafficked.”31 
Although trafficking can occur in low-priced motels situated in 
high-crime areas of a city or town, “[h]uman traffickers operate in 
every category and across every price point of the lodging industry, 
from the cheapest to the most luxurious.”32 Nevertheless, inside the 
confines of these high-priced hotels and economy-level motels and 
inns, the indicia of sex trafficking remain the same.33  
Such indicators include payment for rooms in cash or pre-
paid cards; extended stays with few possessions; requests for 
rooms overlooking a parking lot; presence of excessive 
drugs, alcohol, and/or sex paraphernalia; excessive foot 
traffic in/out of hotel room; and frequent requests for new 
linens, towels, and restocking of the refrigerator.34  
Sex trafficking victims often exhibit signs of being afraid or anxious 
and demonstrate submissive behavior.35 Other signs that a victim 
might exhibit include inappropriate dress in light of the weather, 
hygiene issues, sleep deprivation, malnourishment, and a lack of 
control of personal belongings such as money, cell phones, or 
identification cards.36 Traffickers may also attempt to restrict or 
control a victim’s mobility and communications with others, as well 
as try to conceal his or her whereabouts.37 Hotel employees are 
uniquely positioned to detect these indicia of trafficking because they 
closely interface with hotel guests and regularly enter their rooms for 
servicing and cleaning.38 However, many hotel employees lack 
awareness and training and thus are not aware of what to look for.39 
Notably, the recent emergence of sex trafficking cases filed by 
victims against hotels under a beneficiary liability theory highlight 
many of these very indicators within the allegations of the 
 
 31. Ross, supra note 5, 385–86; ANTHONY ET AL., supra note 30. 
 32. Human Trafficking: What Business Owners Need to Know, FLA. REST. & LODGING, Fall 
2018, at 20. 
 33. See ANTHONY ET AL., supra note 30. 
 34. Ross, supra note 5, at 386; Recommendation Brochure by Polaris, Human Trafficking and 
the Hotel Industry (2019), https://polarisproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/human-
trafficking-hotel-industry-recommendations.pdf [hereinafter Human Trafficking Brochure] 
[https://perma.cc/8WB8-7UMA]. 
 35. Ross, supra note 5, at 386; Human Trafficking Brochure, supra note 34. 
 36. Ross, supra note 5, at 386; Human Trafficking Brochure, supra note 34. 
 37. Ross, supra note 5, at 386; Human Trafficking Brochure, supra note 34. 
 38. ANTHONY ET AL., supra note 30. 
 39. Ross, supra note 5, at 413; Human Trafficking Brochure, supra note 34. 
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complaints.40 Generally, these complaints allege that the hotels knew 
or should have known that the victim was being subjected to sex 
trafficking on its premises due to the presence of these indicia, yet 
failed to report the trafficking to law enforcement or do anything to 
stop it.41 
B.  The Trafficking Victims Protection Act and The Trafficking 
Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 
In 2000, recognizing that there was no comprehensive law in the 
United States that penalized trafficking offenses, Congress enacted the 
TVPA.42 With the enactment of the TVPA, Congress created new 
trafficking crimes and enhanced penalties that could be imposed for 
already-existing involuntary servitude crimes.43 Following its 
enactment in 2000, the TVPA was reauthorized in 2003, 2005, 2008, 
and 2013, with each reauthorization supplementing the Act or certain 
specific provisions of the Act.44 Of these reauthorizations, the most 
 
 40. See, e.g., Complaint at 6–7, M.B. v. Roosevelt Inn LLC, No. 170300712 (Pa. Ct. C.P. 
Mar. 10, 2017); Plaintiff’s Original Petition at 56, Jane Doe #1 v. Backpage.com, No. 2018-04501 
(Tex. Dist. Ct. Jan. 23, 2018); Notice of Removal at 19, K.R. v. Backpage.com, No. 1:17-cv-00299 
(M.D. Ala. May 5, 2017); Complaint at 18–19, M.A. v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc., 425 F. 
Supp. 3d 959 (S.D. Ohio 2019) (No. 2:19-cv-00849); Complaint at 14, H.H. v. G6 Hosp. LLC, No. 
2:19-cv-00755 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 3, 2019); Complaint at 44–45, B.M. v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, 
Inc., No. 5:20-cv-00656 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2020); Complaint at 32–34, J.L. v. Best Western Int’l, 
Inc., No. 1:19-cv-03713 (D. Colo. Dec. 30, 2019). 
 41. See supra note 10. 
 42. Gallant Fish, No Rest for the Wicked: Civil Liability Against Hotels in Cases of Sex 
Trafficking, 23 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 119, 120 (2016–2017). Congress explained that prior to 
the TVPA, there was no all-encompassing law in the United States that penalized the array of 
offenses “involved in the trafficking scheme.” 22 U.S.C. § 7101(b)(14)–(15) (2018). It reads: 
Existing legislation and law enforcement in the United States and other countries are 
inadequate to deter trafficking and bring traffickers to justice, failing to reflect the 
gravity of the offenses involved. No comprehensive law exists in the United States that 
penalizes the range of offenses involved in the trafficking scheme. Instead, even the most 
brutal instances of trafficking in the sex industry are often punished under laws that also 
apply to lesser offenses, so that traffickers typically escape deserved punishment. . . . 
In the United States, the seriousness of this crime and its components is not reflected in 
current sentencing guidelines, resulting in weak penalties for convicted traffickers. 
 43. Fish, supra note 42, at 136; see 22 U.S.C. § 7101(b)(13)–(15). 
 44. Fish, supra note 42, at 137; see also William M. Sullivan, Jr. et al., Human Trafficking 
Raises Corporate Liability Concerns for the Hospitality Industry, PILLSBURY (Feb. 5, 2018), 
https://www.pillsburylaw.com/en/news-and-insights/human-trafficking-raises-corporate-liability-
concerns-for-the-hospitality-industry.html (“Enacted in 2000 and subsequently revised in 2003, 
2005, 2008 and 2013, the TVPA is intended to combat trafficking in persons, especially into the 
sex trade, slavery and involuntary servitude.”). 
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significant with regard to the issue of potential liability against hotels 
were the 2003 and 2008 reauthorizations.45 
The 2003 reauthorization created a civil remedy for trafficking 
victims, allowing them to sue in federal court and recover damages 
and attorney fees.46 Five years later, Congress expanded these civil-
remedy provisions with the passage of the TVPRA.47 In the 2008 
reauthorization, Congress created 18 U.S.C. section 1595(a), allowing 
for beneficiary liability.48 Under this provision, an individual or entity 
that does not directly traffic a victim can be held liable for “knowingly 
benefit[ting], financially or by receiving anything of value from 
participation in a venture which that person knew or should have 
known has engaged in an act in violation of this chapter.”49 
Many states have enacted similar statutes modeled after the 
TVPRA.50 For example, Pennsylvania, Texas, Michigan, and 
Alabama have implemented laws that potentially hold hotels civilly 
liable under a beneficiary liability theory if a sex trafficking victim is 
subjected to trafficking on their premises.51 
II.  THE EMERGENCE OF RECENT SEX TRAFFICKING BENEFICIARY 
LIABILITY ACTIONS AGAINST HOTELS UNDER § 1595(A) 
Over the past few years, there has been a steady increase in the 
beneficiary liability-type claims being filed against hotels by sex 
trafficking victims pursuant to both state and federal laws.52 Some of 
the first cases emerged in states like Pennsylvania, Texas, and 
Alabama.53 Within the last year, the number of recorded cases 
 
 45. See Fish, supra note 42, at 137–38; William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection 
Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044; Trafficking Victims Protection 
Reauthorization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-193, § 4(a)(4), 117 Stat. 2875. 
 46. See Fish, supra note 42, at 137; Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 
2003 § 4(a)(4). 
 47. Fish, supra note 42, at 138. 
 48. Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a) (2018). 
 49. Fish, supra note 42, at 138; 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a). 
 50. Fish, supra note 42, at 142; see, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-157 (West, Westlaw through 
Act 2020-206); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 752.983 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 2020, No. 260, 
of the 2020 Reg. Sess., 100th Leg.); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3051(a)(2)(i) 
(West, Westlaw through 2020 Reg. Sess. Act 95); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 98.002 
(West, Westlaw through the end of the 2019 Reg. Sess. of the 86th Leg.). 
 51. Fish, supra note 42, at 142; see, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-157; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 
§ 752.983; 18 PA. CONS. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3051(a)(2)(i); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. 
CODE ANN. § 98.002. 
 52. See cases supra note 9. 
 53. See cases supra note 9. 
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involving civil liability claims brought against hotels under federal 
law, specifically pursuant to § 1595, has rapidly increased.54 
In 2019, “a loosely organized group of plaintiffs’ lawyers . . . 
began searching for victims [subjected to sex trafficking at hotels] 
through advocacy-group referrals and online advertising, leading to a 
steady stream of lawsuits.”55 Many of these beneficiary liability claims 
are in the infancy stage of litigation and accuse some of the best-
known hotels in the United States of ignoring sex trafficking occurring 
on their premises.56 At the time of this writing, over forty lawsuits had 
been filed in federal courts pursuant to § 1595 under a beneficiary 
liability theory.57 For example, in early December 2019, a New York 
law firm filed a landmark legal action in a federal court in Columbus, 
Ohio, against twelve major hotel chains.58 The action was filed on 
behalf of thirteen women—“many of whom were minors when they 
said the trafficking occurred”—alleging that they were subjected to 
sex trafficking at the hotels’ properties.59 “The filing marked the first 
time the hotel industry . . . faced action as a group. The case drew 
together 13 separate actions that had been filed in places such as Ohio, 
Massachusetts, Georgia, Texas, and New York.”60 
Although many beneficiary liability suits have been filed against 
hotels pursuant to § 1595 since 2019, Ricchio v. McLean,61 a 2017 
First Circuit Court of Appeals opinion, appears to be the first recorded 
opinion involving one of these claims.62 In that decision, the court of 
 
 54. See, e.g., Complaint at 20, M.A. v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 3d 959 
(S.D. Ohio 2019) (No. 2:19-cv-00849); Complaint at 3, H.H. v. G6 Hosp. LLC, No. 2:19-cv-00755 
(S.D. Ohio Mar. 3, 2019); Complaint at 2, B.M. v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc., No. 5:20-cv-
00656 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2020); Complaint at 2, J.L. v. Best Western Int’l, Inc., No. 1:19-cv-03713 
(D. Colo. Dec. 30, 2019). 
 55. See Ramey, supra note 9. 
 56. See id. 
 57. See id. 
 58. Matthew Lavietes, Top Hotels Sued for ‘Industry-Wide Failures’ to Prevent U.S. Sex 
Trafficking, THOMSON REUTERS FOUND. NEWS (Dec. 10, 2019, 4:49 PM), https://news.trust.org/
item/20191210020007-hruah/ (the lawyers sought to consolidate thirteen existing cases in the 
district court of Ohio). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. 853 F.3d 553 (1st Cir. 2017). The First Circuit has remanded the case back to the district 
court. See Peerless, 424 F. Supp. 3d 182, 195 (D. Mass. 2019). 
 62. Id. at 556. Plaintiff Ricchio filed her original beneficiary liability lawsuit in the United 
States District Court for Massachusetts in October 2015. Complaint at 1, Peerless, No. 1:15-cv-
13519 (D. Mass. 2019) [hereinafter Peerless Complaint]. The district court granted the hotel 
defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint in 2016. Order of Feb. 16, 2016 Grating Motion to 
Dismiss, Peerless, No. 1:15-cv-13519 (D. Mass. 2019). After a denial of the plaintiff’s motion to 
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appeals reversed the lower court’s granting of the defendant hotel’s 
motion to dismiss the sex trafficking victim’s complaint against the 
hotel and its owners.63 The complaint alleged that the hotel defendants 
knowingly allowed the trafficker to use the hotel’s rooms to force the 
minor victim to engage in commercial sex acts.64 In reversing the 
lower court, the First Circuit reasoned that the profits received from 
the room rentals could establish the “knowingly benefit[ing]” standard 
under § 1595 and consequently held that the victim had stated 
sufficient facts in her complaint regarding the hotel’s liability under 
§ 1595.65 
Subsequent to Ricchio, two actions were filed in an Ohio federal 
district court in March and October 2019 involving beneficiary 
liability claims brought against hotels under § 1595.66 In October of 
2019, the United States District Court for the Southern District of 
Ohio, in M.A. v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc.,67 denied motions to 
dismiss filed by several hotel chain operators in an action brought by 
a sex trafficking victim alleging that the trafficking occurred at 
numerous hotels such as Days Inn by Wyndham, Comfort Inn, and 
Crowne Plaza.68 The victim alleged that the hotel defendants knew or 
should have known that her trafficking was taking place on their 
properties due to the many indicators that she was being trafficked, 
and thus the defendants were liable under a beneficiary liability 
theory pursuant to the § 1595 of the TVPRA.69 
The M.A. v. Wyndham court relied heavily on the Ricchio opinion 
in denying the hotels’ motions to dismiss.70 The court applied a three-
part test in analyzing whether the victim had stated a claim for 
beneficiary liability under § 1595(a): “(1) the person or entity must 
‘knowingly benefit[ ], financially or by receiving anything of value,’ 
(2) from participating in a venture, (3) that the ‘person knew or should 
 
reconsider, the district court’s order was appealed. Notice Appeal, Peerless, No. 1:15-cv-13519 (D. 
Mass. 2019). 
 63. Ricchio, 853 F.3d at 556. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 556–57. 
 66. See M.A. v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 3d 959, 963 (S.D. Ohio 2019); 
H.H. v. G6 Hosp., LLC, No. 2:19-cv-00755, 2019 WL 6682152, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 6, 2019). 
 67. 425 F. Supp. 3d 959, 974 (S.D. Ohio 2019). 
 68. Id. at 962. 
 69. Id. at 964–65. 
 70. See id. at 966–70. 
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have known has engaged in an act in violation of this chapter.’”71 With 
this framework established, the court concluded that the victim had 
sufficiently stated facts to support each element of a beneficiary 
liability claim under § 1595.72 Just two months later, this same federal 
district court denied motions to dismiss filed by other hotel 
defendants, including Wyndham, on the same basis.73 In this second 
action, H.H. v. G6 Hospitality,74 the victim filed an action alleging 
beneficiary liability against the hotels under § 1595 asserting that the 
hotels were aware that sex trafficking was taking place on their 
premises, failed to prevent it, and knew or should have known that the 
victim was being trafficked due to indicia of trafficking, including the 
housekeeping staff discovering “her chained up in the bathroom” but 
ignoring her cries for help.75 Relying on the “extensive analysis” 
provided in its previous decision in M.A. v. Wyndham76 and based on 
the same reasoning, the court held that the victim had alleged 
sufficient facts to state a claim to relief under § 1595.77 These cases 
are representative of numerous cases currently being filed all over the 
country.78 According to one attorney representing victims in sex 
trafficking beneficiary liability litigation,  
[a]bout 1,500 victims of human trafficking have retained 
lawyers in the various lawsuits and as many as 7,000 are 
expected over time . . . . A settlement could run into the 
billions of dollars . . . because of the size of the problem and 
the evidence that hotels have long known of the trafficking.79 
Some experts have argued that the hotel industry needs to feel the 
negative consequences—both legal and financial—of allowing 
trafficking to occur on their premises or failing to have monitoring 
 
 71. Id. at 964 (alteration in original) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a) (2018)). 
 72. See id. at 965–71. 
 73. H.H. v. G6 Hosp., LLC, No. 2:19-cv-00755, 2019 WL 6682152, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 6, 
2019). 
 74. No. 2:19-cv-00755, 2019 WL 6682152 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 6, 2019). 
 75. Id. at *1. 
 76. Id. at *2. “In its October 7, 2019 Opinion and Order in MA v. Wyndham Hotel & Resorts, 
Inc., this Court undertook an extensive analysis in a related case of the Trafficking Victims 
Protection Reauthorization Act (‘TVPRA’) and its application to civil liability of hotel defendants 
for sex trafficking.” Id. 
 77. See id. at *2–5. 
 78. See Ramey, supra note 9; Lavietes, supra note 58. 
 79. Lawsuits Allege Hotel Chains Ignored Human Trafficking, USA TODAY (Dec. 19, 2019, 
8:28 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/travel/hotels/2019/12/19/lawsuits-allege-hotel-chains-
ignored-human-trafficking/2696622001/. 
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protocols in place to detect trafficking.80 Human trafficking scholar 
Louise Shelley has noted how corporations have previously engaged 
in business reform efforts to take a stance against other criminal 
conduct such as drug trafficking, which came in part as a result of 
negative financial, legal, and reputational consequences faced by those 
companies.81 Conversely, however, those same reform efforts have 
not been replicated by companies such as hotels who facilitate human 
trafficking.82 
Since hotels have failed to be diligent in their efforts against 
trafficking, additional financial measures must be taken to address 
these deficiencies and promote change in the hotel industry.83 Thus, it 
is my contention that the risk of not being provided a defense or 
indemnification by an insurer will undoubtedly serve as a negative 
financial consequence for a hotel’s failure to implement and/or adhere 
to anti-trafficking measures. 
Insurance companies have in fact begun filing declaratory actions 
to disclaim their duty to defend and indemnify hotels and hotel 
management companies.84 Filing these declaratory actions and 
seeking to exclude coverage will allow insurers to play a regulatory 
role in the fight to end sex trafficking at our nation’s hotels. 
III.  INSURANCE AS A REGULATOR IN THE FIGHT AGAINST SEX 
TRAFFICKING AT HOTELS 
Proactively engaging in anti-human trafficking compliance 
is . . . necessary from both corporate social responsibility and 
risk management perspectives. Indeed, not only is it an 
effective way to play a significant role in the fight against 
exploitation, but it also reduces business risk by mitigating a 
company’s exposure to potential corporate liability.85  
 
 80. Ross, supra note 5, at 408–11; see Fish, supra note 42, at 133–34. 
 81. Fish, supra note 42, at 134 n.111 (discussing LOUISE SHELLEY, HUMAN TRAFFICKING: A 
GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE (2010)). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 134 n.110. 
 84. See supra note 11; see Larry P. Schiffer, Exclusion Relieves Insurer of Duty to Defend in 
Sex Trafficking Case, NAT’L L. REV. (July 23, 2019), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/excl
usion-relieves-insurer-duty-to-defend-sex-trafficking-case. “In the mundane world of insurance, 
sex trafficking has become a coverage issue for insurance companies when faced with an insured[] 
[hotel’s] request to defend and indemnify against sex trafficking claims.” Id. 
 85. Sullivan et al., supra note 44. 
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Insurance law scholars have argued that insurance serves a regulatory 
function and that “insurers are increasingly acting as corporate 
regulators.”86 “[I]nsurance institutions act as risk regulators and 
regulate so many aspects of an . . . organization’s relationships in 
society.”87 Insurers, thus, can use their risk management tools to 
impact a corporation’s compliance with laws and corporate social 
responsibility.88 
Further, “[a]n insurance policy . . . is a social institution that 
affects risk management [and] deterrence.”89 Through the essential 
functions of risk reduction and risk management, insurance 
arrangements utilize tools such as deductibles and exclusions to 
incentivize private parties to reduce risks.90 Risk management tools 
such as exclusions of coverage present one mechanism to reduce 
“moral hazard”91—the concept that “a person carrying insurance, 
knowing of the insurance coverage, might take more risks than one 
who does not carry insurance.”92 Stated another way, “moral hazard” 
refers to the “effect of insurance in causing the insured to relax the 
care he or she takes to safeguard his or her property because the loss 
will be borne in whole or part by the insurance company.”93 
Because coverage exclusions directly allocate losses to 
policyholders, they can have beneficial effects on controlling moral 
hazard.94 Exclusions can place the burden of particular policy losses 
exclusively on policyholders, which in turn can lead to policyholders 
increasing their preventive efforts to reduce or eliminate the risks.95 
Accordingly, the prospect of not being provided insurance 
coverage due to policy exclusions, and thus having to bear the defense 
costs and potentially huge damage awards alone, will likely decrease 
the chance of moral hazard by hotels—that is, reduce the chance of 
them failing to put forth diligent efforts in implementing anti-
 
 86. Talesh, supra note 18, at 465. 
 87. Id. 
 88. See id. at 466. 
 89. Leo P. Martinez, A Unified Theory of Insurance Risk, 74 U. PITT. L. REV. 713, 722 (2013). 
 90. Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 21, at 199. 
 91. See Talesh, supra note 18, at 471. 
 92. DAVID P. LEONARD, THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE: SELECTED RULES 
OF LIMITED ADMISSIBILITY § 6.2.1 (3d ed. 2019). 
 93. 44 AM. JUR. 2D Insurance § 1198, Westlaw (database updated May 2021). 
 94. Id. 
 95. Priest, supra note 23, at 648. 
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trafficking preventative measures to help end the pervasiveness of sex 
trafficking occurring in hotels. 
An example of the regulatory impact that insurance companies 
can have on insureds by using risk management tools such as 
excluding coverage can be seen in sexual abuse claims against the 
Catholic Church.96 “[A]fter 1987 [insurance companies] began to 
refuse coverage for [clergy sexual] abuse and for failing to screen, 
train, or supervise priests.”97 Even when insurers began offering this 
coverage, many of the policies were subject to numerous conditions 
which effectively resulted in nominal coverage to the churches.98 
For example, some policies might have included coverage 
exclusions for claims involving a “previously identified perpetrator” 
or an exclusion for incidents of abuse that occurred prior to a certain 
date.99 As a result of the conditions that were attached to these sexual 
misconduct/abuse policies, the coverage afforded was often not 
adequate to pay the monetary damages.100 Hence, these religious 
institutions have often had the responsibility of paying these 
judgments themselves.101 
In instances where insurance coverage was granted, insurers 
insisted that policies and procedures were implemented that would 
help curtail incidents of clergy sexual misconduct.102 Consequently, 
the Catholic Church began to place a greater emphasis on reform 
efforts and implementation of preventative policies to end clergy 
sexual abuse, including personnel screening and the creation of strict 
guidelines for dealing with children.103 Accordingly, liability 
 
 96. See Alana Bartley, Note, The Liability Insurance Regulation of Religious Institutions After 
the Catholic Church Sexual Abuse Scandal, 16 CONN. INS. L.J. 505 (2010). 
 97. Angela C. Carmella, Catholic Institutions in Court: The Religion Clauses and Political-
Legal Compromise, 120 W. VA. L. REV. 1, 46 (2017); Bartley, supra note 96, at 532 (noting that 
in the early 1990s, insurers began providing coverage for clergy sexual abuse, following a period 
of time where such abuse was completely excluded from coverage). 
 98. Bartley, supra note 96, at 532. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 533. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 534. 
[T]he resulting lawsuits by the victims caused the liability insurance carriers of religious 
institutions to craft conditions and exceptions to policies, and placed the majority of the 
liability for the acts of clergy sexual misconduct in the hands of the religious institutions. 
Religious institutions, like the Catholic Church, . . . prompted either by liability 
insurance companies or on their own accord, were forced to make drastic policy changes 
to avoid the resulting liability from lawsuits of clergy sexual abuse victims. Id. 
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insurance companies in their regulatory roles “incentivized religious 
institutions to implement policies to curb clergy sexual 
misconduct.”104 
Applying these concepts to the sex trafficking beneficiary 
liability suits being filed against hotels, insurers are now in a position 
to have a regulatory impact on the sexual abuse of trafficking victims 
occurring in hotels by way of excluding coverage for these types of 
claims. 
IV.  THE RISING TIDE OF DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTIONS AND 
THE ASSERTATION OF COVERAGE EXCLUSIONS 
A.  Ground-Breaking Actions: Nautilus and Peerless 
Nautilus Insurance Co. v. Motel Management Services, Inc.105 is 
the first recorded decision where an insurer did in fact seek to disclaim 
its duty to defend and indemnify the hotel operator in a sex trafficking 
beneficiary liability suit based on a policy exclusion.106 In May 2018, 
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania held that because the negligence claims alleged by the 
plaintiff in the underlying sex trafficking beneficiary liability action 
arose from negligent conduct contributing to an assault and battery, 
they were barred by the insurer’s “All Assault or Battery” exclusion 
in the general commercial liability policy.107 The court further noted 
that the claims were barred because providing coverage would be 
against Pennsylvania public policy.108 The district court’s ruling was 
appealed and was later upheld by the Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals.109 
Conversely, in Peerless, a federal district court in Massachusetts 
in 2019 came to a different conclusion and held that the insurer in that 
case did in fact have a duty to defend its hotel insured in the underlying 
sex trafficking beneficiary liability claim.110 The court concluded that 
 
 104. Id. 
 105. See Nautilus Ins. Co. v. Motel Mgmt. Servs., Inc. (Nautilus II), 781 F. App’x. 57 (3d Cir. 
2019). 
 106. Id. at 57. 
 107. Nautilus I, 320 F. Supp. 3d 636, 643 (E.D. Pa. 2018), aff’d, 781 F. App’x. 57 (3d Cir. 
2019). 
 108. Id. 
 109. See Nautilus II, 781 F. App’x at 61. 
 110. Peerless, 424 F. Supp. 3d 182, 195 (D. Mass. 2019). 
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a criminal acts exclusion did not preclude coverage.111 The court 
further reasoned that the allegations against the hotel defendants, 
which alleged that they engaged in intentional criminal conduct 
violating the TVPA, did not preclude an interpretation that the 
complaint included lesser allegations of negligent conduct pursuant to 
the TVPRA.112 Thus, the allegations of the underlying complaint met 
the state’s duty to defend standard, requiring only a “general 
allegation” susceptible to a possibility of liability insurance 
coverage.113 
Since Nautilus and Peerless are seminal cases addressing this 
vital coverage issue, an examination of arguments by the insurers and 
the hotel insureds in these cases, and the policy exclusions at issue, 
may be instructive and may provide guidance as to how courts will 
handle this critical issue going forward. If courts find, as the Nautilus 
court did, that coverage is barred based on applicable exclusions, the 
reality of facing million-dollar awards without the “safety net” of 
insurance coverage should incentivize hotels to effect meaningful 
change in ending sex trafficking on their premises. 
1.  Nautilus Insurance Co. v. Motel Management Services, Inc. 
Nautilus stems from an underlying action by E.B., a minor, who 
sued Motel Management Services, Inc. (MMS) and the motel 
operators in state court alleging that she was subjected to sex 
trafficking in violation of Pennsylvania’s Human Trafficking Law.114 
The victim also alleged that she was held at gun point, coerced to 
participate in sex acts with traffickers, and was subjected to physical 
harm.115 The complaint further avers that MMS “facilitated her 
exploitation by knowingly renting rooms at its motel to the 
traffickers . . . failed to intervene or to report the traffickers’ illegal 
conduct; and . . . financially profited from E.B.’s exploitation.”116 
In response to the victim’s lawsuit, Nautilus filed a declaratory 
judgment action and asserted that it was exempted from its duty to 
defend and indemnify MMS in the suit by E.B. because of the “assault 
 
 111. Id. at 189–95. 
 112. Id. at 195. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Nautilus II, 781 F. App’x at 58; see 18 PA. CONS. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3011 
(West, Westlaw through 2021 Reg. Sess. Act 14). 
 115. Nautilus II, 781 F. App’x at 58. 
 116. Id. 
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and battery” exclusion in MMS’s insurance policy which excluded 
claims arising out of an assault or battery, “including a failure to 
prevent or suppress an assault or battery.”117 Nautilus ultimately filed 
a motion for judgment on the pleadings and the district court granted 
Nautilus’s motion, “declaring that Nautilus had no duty to defend and 
indemnify MMS because E.B.’s claims in the underlying action arose 
from facts alleging negligent failure to prevent an assault or battery 
and therefore were not covered by the insurance policy.”118 
Following the district court granting Nautilus’s motion for 
judgment on the pleadings, MMS appealed the court’s decision to the 
Third Circuit Court of Appeals.119 In its brief, MMS argued that it was 
entitled to coverage under its policy with Nautilus because Nautilus 
had a duty to provide coverage for claims of negligence and E.B. had 
filed the action alleging MMS was negligent “with regard to human 
trafficking violations.”120 Thus, the face of the complaint did not 
implicate any of the exceptions listed in the policy that Nautilus 
contended were applicable.121 
The relevant policy exclusion at issue in the case stated: 
[R]egardless of culpability or intent of any person, . . . there 
is no coverage for “bodily injury” or “personal and 
advertising injury” arising out of any: (1) actual or alleged 
assault or battery; (2) physical altercation; or (3) any act or 
omission in connection with the prevention or suppression of 
such acts. It applies regardless of whether such actual or 
alleged damages are caused by an employee, patron or any 
other person. The exclusion applies to all causes of action 
arising out of any assault, battery, or physical altercation 
including allegations of any act, error, or omission relating to 
such an assault, battery, or physical altercation. It also applies 
to any claim arising out of any act or omission in connection 
with the prevention or suppression of an assault, battery or 
physical altercation, including failure to provide adequate 
 
 117. Id. at 59. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 58. 
 120. Brief of Appellant at 10, Nautilus II, 781 F. App’x. 57 (3d Cir. 2019) (No. 18-2290), WL 
4146264, at *10 [hereinafter MMS’s Brief].  
 121. Id. at 10–11. 
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security, negligent hiring, placement, training, or 
supervision.122 
In reminding the court that it was limited to considering “the four 
corners of the underlying Complaint as well as the four corners of the 
insurance contract” when determining the coverage issue, MMS also 
argued that the court had the duty to accept the factual allegations of 
the underlying complaint “as true and liberally construe[] . . . [them] 
in favor of the insured.”123 MMS argued that the facts stated in the 
complaint, as well as the claim for damages, have to be compared to 
the insurance policy when determining whether an insured has a duty 
to defend and provide coverage.124 To that end, MMS argued that 
E.B.’s complaint never sought damages from the insured for harm 
suffered as a result of an assault and/or rape but rather her complaint 
seeks damages for negligence.125 
MMS proceeded by discussing that E.B.’s allegations “stem[] 
from human trafficking negligence” and that nowhere in her complaint 
does E.B. allege that “MMS participated in the sex acts alleged” or 
“had any direct involvement with any sex trafficker or handler.”126 
Additionally, MMS argued that “based upon the definition [of human 
trafficking, it is not] required that a victim of human trafficking suffer 
assaultive conduct or rape.”127 
MMS directed the Third Circuit to examine the specific language 
of the policy which provides that the listed exclusions are applicable 
when the injuries allegedly suffered “arise out of” actual assault or 
battery or alleged assault or battery.128 MMS referenced the Third 
Circuit’s decision in a previous unpublished opinion129 where it 
reversed a summary judgment order on the basis that it could not “be 
determined as a matter of law [from the allegations of the complaint] 
 
 122. Brief of Appellee at 14–15, Nautilus II, 781 F. App’x. 57 (3d Cir. 2019) (No. 18-2290) 
(citations omitted) [hereinafter Nautilus’s Brief]. 
 123. MMS’s Brief, supra note 120, at 10–11. 
 124. See id. at 11. The brief cites Donegal Mutual Insurance Co. v. Baumhammers, 938 A.2d 
286, 290 (Pa. 2007), which held that “[a]n insurer’s duty to defend an action against the insured is 
measured, in the first instance, by the allegations in the plaintiff’s pleadings. . . . In determining the 
duty to defend, the complaint claiming damages must be compared to the policy and a 
determination made as to whether, if the allegations are sustained, the insurer would be required to 
pay resulting judgment.” Id. (alteration in original) (emphasis added). 
 125. MMS’s Brief, supra note 120, at 10–11. 
 126. Id. at 14–15. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 20. 
 129. Id. (quoting Essex Ins. Co. v. Starlight Mgmt. Co., 198 F. App’x 179 (3d Cir. 2006)). 
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that the [victim’s] injuries ‘arise out of’ assault and/or battery.”130 
Relying on this finding, MMS argued that the court’s own precedent 
required it to make a determination as to whether the damages sought 
by E.B. in her complaint “ar[o]se out of” an assault or battery.131 MMS 
contended that the court could not conclude this because E.B.’s 
allegations “arise from” her being a human trafficking victim, which 
does not equate with her being a victim of assault or battery.132 Hence, 
MMS concluded that the exceptions proscribed in the policy are 
“simply not implicated by the conduct alleged in this case.”133 
Accordingly, MMS urged the court to hold that the listed exclusions 
in Nautilus’s policy were inapplicable and require the insurer to 
provide coverage to MMS because there was in fact a possibility that 
the allegations fell within the policy’s coverage.134 
In response to MMS arguments, the court stated that its decision 
regarding whether Nautilus has a duty to defend MMS is limited to an 
examination of the four corners of the complaint and how it aligns with 
the actual terms of the insurance contract.135 The court urged that there 
were no exceptions to the “four corners” rule, “even if the insurer 
knows or should know that the allegations in the complaint are 
untrue.”136 
In ascertaining Nautilus’s duty to provide coverage and defend 
under the policy, the court highlighted the following policy language: 
The exclusion provides that Nautilus “will have no duty to 
defend or indemnify any insured in any action or proceeding 
alleging damages arising out of any assault or battery,” 
regardless of culpability, intent, or relationship of the 
perpetrator of the assault or battery to the insured, or whether 
the damages occurred at premises owned or operated by the 
insured. The assault and battery exclusion specifically omits 
from the policy’s coverage “[a]ll causes of action arising out 
of any assault or battery” or “any act, error, or omission 
relating to such an assault or battery.”137 
 
 130. Id. (second alteration in original). 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 20–21. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Nautilus II, 781 F. App’x 57, 59 (3d Cir. 2019). 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 60. 
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The court noted that “but for” causation was the standard for 
interpreting the “arising out of” language; thus, if “an assault or battery 
was a ‘but for’ cause of the plaintiff’s injuries, the assault and battery 
exclusion will apply to allegations that the insured’s negligence 
contributed to the injuries.”138 The court expounded on this point and 
reasoned that an insurer will only have a duty to defend when the 
allegations in the complaint assert that the insured’s negligence 
directly led to the plaintiff’s injuries.139 
Based on this principle, the Third Circuit concluded that all of the 
alleged injuries in E.B.’s underlying complaint were “the result of 
exploitation and assault by traffickers and customers with whom E.B. 
engaged in commercial sex acts.”140 Hence, the court held that “the 
assault and battery were the ‘but for’ causes of the injuries E.B. 
claims.”141 The court went on to explain that at no time in her 
complaint did she allege that MMS’s negligence was the direct cause 
of her injuries or caused her any separate harm; instead, E.B. averred 
that MMS failed to intervene or report the actions of the sex traffickers 
and financially benefited from the abuse she endured.142 The court 
concluded the opinion by holding that Nautilus’s assault and battery 
exclusion “unambiguously bars coverage for E.B.’s claims” because 
the policy language “encompasses claims arising both from an assault 
or battery and from a failure to prevent or suppress an assault and 
battery.”143 
MMS also challenged Nautilus’s public policy argument that 
insuring against intentional tort claims or claims involving criminal 
misconduct is against public policy.144 Nautilus argued that offering 
coverage to the hotel for such a claim would be against Pennsylvania 
 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. In holding this, the court relied on two Pennsylvania Superior Court opinions to support 
its reasoning: Acceptance Insurance Co. v. Seybert, 757 A.2d 380, 383 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000) and 
QBE Insurance Corp. v. M & S Landis Corp., 915 A.2d 1222, 1229 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007). In 
Seybert, the court found that there was no duty to defend where insured bar’s negligence in serving 
alcohol to visibly intoxicated men who subsequently attacked plaintiff in underlying action was 
merely a contributing factor and not a direct cause of plaintiff’s injuries. Seybert, 757 A.2d at 383. 
In QBE, the court found that an insurer had a duty to defend a nightclub that negligently trained 
staff who restrained a patron because the negligence of the nightclub and its staff directly caused 
plaintiff’s injuries. QBE, 915 A.2d at 1229. 
 140. Nautilus II, 781 F. App’x at 60. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. MMS’s Brief, supra note 120, at 21. 
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public policy, as the complaint alleged knowing involvement of 
criminal acts.145 Specifically, it asserted that the complaint alleged that 
the hotel was in violation of Pennsylvania’s Human Trafficking Law 
“by harboring her, failing to report alleged human trafficking and 
involuntary sexual servitude to the authorities” despite knowing of the 
trafficking, and knowingly profiting financially as a result of the 
minor’s involuntary servitude.146 Because the Pennsylvania legislature 
had pronounced that this conduct was criminal, and thus against public 
policy, there was no expectation that insurers would defend or 
indemnify their insureds who fall into these situations.147 
In response, MMS argued that its agents never engaged in an 
intentional tort nor did E.B.’s complaint or Nautilus aver that MMS 
engaged in an intentional tort.148 Thus, the district court’s rationale 
could only hold relevance if MMS participated in criminal 
misconduct.149 In noting that it is a regular practice for insurance 
companies to provide coverage to insureds when third parties commit 
a crime, MMS acknowledged that coverage is typically barred when 
the insured commits the crime.150 However, it disputed that it engaged 
in any criminal conduct and criticized the district court for providing 
“limited analysis” on this point by simply stating that “financially 
benefitting from human sex trafficking is criminalized under the 
Pennsylvania Human Trafficking Law . . . [t]hus public policy 
precludes coverage.”151 
MMS asserted that “financially benefitting” from sex trafficking 
has not been criminalized in Pennsylvania.152 MMS further rebutted 
the district court by stating that “[i]f this Court actually review[ed] 18 
Pa. C.S. Section 3011(a)(2), there is a mens rea aspect to the crime. A 
party must knowingly benefit financially to have committed a 
crime.”153 Additionally, MMS argued that E.B.’s complaint also 
alleged that MMS violated Pennsylvania’s sex trafficking statute by 
 
 145. Nautilus’s Brief, supra note 122, at 20. 
 146. Id. at 8. 
 147. Id. at 6. 
 148. MMS’s Brief, supra note 120, at 22. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. (quoting Nautilus I, 320 F. Supp. 3d 636, 643 (E.D. Pa. 2018), aff’d, 781 F. App’x. 57 
(3d Cir. 2019)). 
 152. Id. (citing 18 PA. CONS. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3011 (West, Westlaw through 
2021 Reg. Sess. Act 14)). 
 153. Id. 
(9) 54.3_ROSS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/20/21  2:53 PM 
866 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:843 
“‘harboring’ E.B. which caused or permitted her to engage in 
commercial sex acts” but that section also contains a “knowing” 
requirement.154 Specifically, MMS contended that pursuant to section 
3011(a)(1), a person commits a crime if he “recruits, entices, solicits, 
harbors, transports, provides, obtains or maintains an individual [and] 
the person knows or recklessly disregards that the individual will be 
subject to involuntary servitude.”155 Based on this provision, MMS 
reasoned that since the scope of E.B.’s allegations could lead to a 
finding that MMS acted negligently while not finding that MMS 
possessed the requisite knowledge to have committed a crime under 
section 3011(a)(1), public policy did not bar coverage.156 
The Third Circuit never addressed either parties’ public policy 
arguments but rather held that since the allegations of the complaint 
triggered the assault and battery exclusion and thus precluded 
coverage, there was no need to address whether public policy would 
also bar coverage for the intentional torts and criminal misconduct that 
E.B. pled in her complaint.157 
2.  Peerless 
In November 2019, four months after the Third Circuit’s decision 
in Nautilus, a federal district court in Massachusetts held that an 
insurer, Peerless Indemnity Insurance Company, did have a duty to 
defend a motel that was accused of financially benefitting from the sex 
trafficking of a victim at its insured’s motel.158 In the underlying 
action, the victim alleged that she was kidnapped by the trafficker, one 
of the named defendants, in 2011 and brought to the Shangri-La motel 
in Massachusetts, owned by Bijal, Inc.159 The complaint further 
alleged that other co-defendants in the underlying action, the Patels, 
lived and were employed at the motel during the time that the victim 
was held captive by her trafficker, where she was repeatedly raped, 
abused, and told that she would be forced to perform commercial sex 
acts.160 The victim alleged that the Patels were aware of her trafficking 
 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 22–23. 
 156. Id. at 23. 
 157. Nautilus II, 781 F. App’x 57, 60 (3d Cir. 2019). The Third Circuit rendered its decision in 
an unpublished brief opinion on July 22, 2019. 
 158. Peerless, 424 F. Supp. 3d 182, 195 (D. Mass. 2019); Schiffer, supra note 84. 
 159. Peerless Complaint, supra note 62, at 1–2. 
 160. Id. 
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and financially profited from it.161 Specifically, the complaint asserts 
that the insured motel and the Patels violated the TVRPA by 
financially benefitting from the sex trafficker’s conduct at the motel 
by way of its receipt of rent payments for the rooms where the 
trafficking occurred.162 
Peerless had issued two insurance policies to the insured motel 
that were at issue in the declaratory judgment action—a general 
liability policy and an umbrella policy.163 Two types of coverage were 
provided under the general liability policy, “Coverage A” and 
“Coverage B.”164 Under “Coverage A,” “Bodily Injury and Property 
Damage Liability,” Peerless agreed to pay for damages due to “bodily 
injury.”165 One key exclusion provided under Coverage A was 
“Exclusion (o), entitled ‘Personal and Advertising Injury,’” which 
excluded coverage for “‘bodily injury’ arising out of ‘personal and 
advertising injury.’”166 This section defined “personal and advertising 
injury” as “injury, including consequential ‘bodily injury,’ arising out 
of one or more” of a list of “offenses,” which included false 
imprisonment.167 
“Coverage B,” “Personal and Advertising Injury,” provided 
coverage for personal and advertising injury but listed numerous 
categories of exclusions.168 Of particular importance was “Exclusion 
(d),” “Criminal Acts,” which stated that the policy did not apply to 
“‘[p]ersonal and advertising injury’ arising out of a criminal act 
committed by or at the direction of the insured.”169 
Peerless argued in its brief to the district court that all of the 
victim’s claims were barred under exclusion (o) of Coverage A, which 
 
 161. Id. at 6, 14. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Peerless, 424 F. Supp. 3d at 187. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. In addition to the general liability policy, the motel had an umbrella policy that 
provided that Peerless would pay “those sums in excess of the ‘retained limit’ that the insured 
becomes legally obligated to pay damages because of ‘bodily injury.’” Id. Further, the umbrella 
policy provided coverage for “‘[p]ersonal and advertising injury’ caused by an ‘offense’ arising out 
of [the insured’s] business.” Id. at 188. (alterations in original). Akin to the general liability policy, 
the umbrella policy also included numerous categories of exclusions. Particularly, “Exclusion (s),” 
“Personal and Advertising Injury,” stated that the umbrella policy was inapplicable to “personal 
and advertising injury . . . [a]rising out of a criminal act committed by or at the direction of any 
insured.” Id. 
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excluded coverage for “bodily injury” arising out of false 
imprisonment.170 The victim countered this argument in her brief, 
asserting that the source of her personal injury was the trafficker’s “act 
of trafficking her for labor and sex”—not her false imprisonment.171 
The court rejected this argument, however, and noted that the victim 
failed to provide anything “to suggest why her alleged injuries should 
be understood as ‘arising out’ of her trafficking but not out of her 
imprisonment.”172 
The district court in its opinion noted other Massachusetts 
precedent that reasoned that the phrase “arising out of” should have a 
broad interpretation that requires a “‘sufficiently close relationship’ or 
a ‘reasonably apparent’ causal connection between the injury and 
relevant event.”173 Accordingly, the district court held that it would 
“construe the phrase ‘arising out of’ to have its typical meaning under 
Massachusetts law. . . . [which] leads . . . to the conclusion that [the 
victim’s] injuries arose out of her false imprisonment” and were thus 
excluded under Coverage A.174 
As to Coverage B, which provided coverage for “personal injury” 
“caused by an offense arising out of [the insured’s] business,” Peerless 
argued that the victim’s injuries were also barred based on certain 
exclusions.175 Peerless’s main argument was that the victim’s claims 
were barred by exclusion (d) of Coverage B, which precludes coverage 
for “personal injury” “arising out of criminal acts committed by or at 
the direction of the insured.”176 More specifically, Peerless argued that 
 
 170. Id. at 189–90. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 190. 
 173. Id. (quoting AIG Prop. Cas. Co. v. Cosby, 892 F.3d 25, 28 (1st Cir. 2018)). 
 174. Id. at 191. 
 175. Id. at 192. 
 176. Id. In examining the first two issues, the court stated: 
First—and somewhat inconsistently—Peerless contends that Ricchio’s injuries do not 
amount to a personal injury because they are “based upon alleged violations of the 
TVPA,” and the TVPA “does not constitute a ‘personal . . . injury.’” It is not entirely 
clear what Peerless means by that. The relevant question is whether Ricchio’s injuries—
which she alleges were caused by violations of the TVPA—constitute a personal injury. 
Because the definition of personal injury under the policy includes injuries arising out 
of false imprisonment, and because Ricchio’s injuries at least in part arose out of her 
false imprisonment, the answer to that question is yes. 
Id. 
As to the second argument, the court continued:  
Second, Peerless contends that Ricchio’s injuries were not caused by an offense “arising 
out” of Bijal’s business, because Bijal is not “in the business of human trafficking.” The 
trafficking that allegedly took place here, however, encompassed multiple acts, including 
(9) 54.3_ROSS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/20/21  2:53 PM 
2021]  SEX TRAFFICKING IN THE HOTEL INDUSTRY 869 
the injuries suffered by the victim were caused by the Patels’ criminal 
violations of the TVPA and, thus, were barred by exclusion (d).177 
In response, the victim argued that exclusion (d) was inapplicable 
because she alleged in the complaint that the motel and Patels 
financially benefitted from the trafficker’s crime—a civil violation of 
the TVPRA.178 Thus, exclusion (d) did not apply because it required 
the criminal act be committed by or at the direction of defendants.179 
Examining the provisions of the Acts, the court found that each 
of the TVPA’s criminal provisions had a “mens rea requirement of 
knowing or reckless conduct by the accused.”180 Conversely, the court 
noted that the TVPRA’s civil provisions did not have the same 
requirement and only required that a person “knowingly benefit[], . . . 
from participation in a venture which that person knew or should have 
known has engaged in an act in violation” of the Act to be held 
liable.181 The court further noted that the “knew or should have 
known” language “echoes common language used in describing an 
objective standard of negligence.”182 Hence, the district court 
concluded that it was feasible for a defendant to be civilly liable 
without having committed any criminal violations under the Act 
because it allows a victim to recover under a civil standard even where 
there is no proof of intentional conduct.183 
 
the Patels’ [hotel managers] alleged agreement to continue renting a room to McLean 
[trafficker], providing him with the privacy he needed to perform the abuse. And it is 
clear that the act of renting a room to McLean satisfies the “two-prong test” used by 
Massachusetts courts to “determin[e]” whether “an activity” that caused an injury 
“ar[ose] out of . . . [an] insured’s business.” That test, as the name suggests, requires 
asking two questions: (1) whether the activity is “one in which the insured regularly 
engages as a means of livelihood,” and (2) whether “the purpose of the activity [is] be to 
obtain monetary gain.” Here, the complaint clearly alleges that defendants regularly 
rented out rooms to overnight guests, and that they did so for the purpose of making 
money. Indeed, providing rooms for money is surely the core function of Bijal’s business 
as a motel. Accordingly, Ricchio has shown that her alleged injuries were caused, at least 
in part, by an offense arising out of Bijal’s business. 
Id. (quoting Preferred Mut. Ins. Co. v. Vt. Mut. Ins. Co., 32 N.E. 3d 336, 341 (Mass. App. Ct. 
2015)). 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. at 193 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589(a); 1590(a); 1591(a); 1594(a-b); 1593A (2018)). 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. (citing M.A. v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 3d 959, 966 (S.D. Ohio 
2019) (allowing plaintiff to pursue liability claims under the TVPRA against two hotels and finding 
that the statute “invokes a negligence standard”)). 
 183. Id. at 194. 
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The court then turned to the question of whether the victim’s 
allegations in the complaint were “‘reasonably susceptible’ to a 
‘possibility’ of insurance liability under the coverage.”184 The 
“reasonably susceptible” standard had been discussed earlier in the 
opinion where the court explained that in order for the duty to defend 
to be triggered, the allegations in the underlying complaint need only 
be “reasonably susceptible of an interpretation that they state or 
adumbrate a claim covered by the policy terms.”185 The court further 
noted that there was “no requirement that the facts alleged in the 
complaint specifically and unequivocally make out a claim within the 
coverage.”186 
With this standard as the backdrop, the court examined the claims 
asserted by the victim in the complaint against the motel and the Patels 
under 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a), which essentially alleged intentional 
violations of the Act.187 
The court concluded that although all the claims were “cast in 
terms of intentional, not negligent, conduct,” the allegations only had 
to establish generally a “possibility that the liability claim falls within 
the insurance coverage.”188 The court concluded that although the 
victim’s claims allege that the Patels engaged in criminal conduct, the 
complaint is “‘reasonably susceptible’ to an interpretation finding only 
negligence.”189 “The fact that the complaint alleges intentional 
conduct does not preclude an interpretation that it also includes lesser 
allegations of negligent conduct. That approach accords with the 
 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. at 188 (quoting Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. SCA Servs., Inc., 588 N.E.2d 1346, 1347 
(Mass. 1992)). 
 186. Id. (quoting Billings v. Com. Ins. Co., 936 N.E.2d 408, 414 (Mass. 2010)). 
 187. Id. at 194. For example, two of the claims alleged against the motel and the Patels were 
that they 
“knowingly benefitted from participat[ing] in [the trafficker’s] venture, knowing or in 
reckless disregard of the fact that the venture was engaged in the providing or obtaining 
of [the victim's] labor or services by means of . . . force . . .” in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
1589. . . . [And] “knowingly harbored and maintained [the victim] at [the motel] and 
benefitted from her labor and services, knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that 
means of force, fraud, [and] coercion . . . would be used to force [the victim] to engage 
in commercial sex acts,” “knowingly benefitted from participation in [the trafficker’s] 
venture, knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that means of force . . . would be used 
to cause . . . [the victim] to engage in a commercial sex act,” and “aided and abetted [the 
trafficker],” all in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1591. 
Id. 
 188. Id. at 194–95 (quoting Billings, 936 N.E.2d at 414). 
 189. Id. at 195. 
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Massachusetts duty to defend standard that requires only a ‘general 
allegation’ susceptible to a ‘possibility’ of liability insurance 
coverage.”190 Hence, the court held that the victim’s claims were 
“reasonably susceptible to a possibility of insurance liability under 
Coverage B” and Peerless had a duty to defend the motel under the 
policy.191 
B.  The Implications of Nautilus and Peerless 
Since Nautilus and Peerless, there has been an uptick in the 
number of related declaratory judgment actions being filed. Less than 
one year after the Pennsylvania federal district court’s opinion in 
Nautilus, another insurer filed a similar declaratory judgment action 
against its hotel insured and hotel management company arguing that 
it did not have a duty to defend or indemnify the hotel insured against 
a sex trafficking beneficiary liability suit.192 Samsung Fire and Marine 
Insurance Co., v. UFVS Management Co., filed in the same 
Pennsylvania district court as Nautilus, stemmed from three 
underlying sex trafficking beneficiary liability actions against the 
management company, hotel insured, Roosevelt Inn, and hotel 
managers/owners.193 Samsung is seeking a declaration from the court 
that it does not owe the hotel defendants a duty to defend or indemnify 
against the underlying actions, asserting the following arguments and 
policy exclusions: 
 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. Additionally, in noting that Peerless had a duty to defend, the court reasoned it did not 
express any view on whether Peerless also had a duty to indemnify which “is determined under a 
different standard.” Id. "[T]he issue of indemnification must await the completing of trial or 
settlement." Id. (quoting AIG Prop. Cas. Co. v. Green, 217 F. Supp. 3d 415, 425 (D. Mass. 2016)). 
There is “a meaningful difference between an insurer’s duty to defend . . . and a duty to indemnify.” 
Id. at 188. (quoting Wilkinson v. Citation Ins. Co., 856 N.E.2d 829, 836 (Mass. 2006)). Unlike the 
duty to indemnify, which “arises only after the insured’s liability has been established,” “[t]he duty 
to defend arises in situations involving . . . actual litigation by a third party, a context in which time 
is of the essence, and in which cost and complexity can compound each passing day.” Id. at 195 
(quoting Wilkinson, 856 N.E.2d at 836). “Accordingly, the issue of whether Peerless has a duty to 
defend the Patels and Bijal is ripe for adjudication.” Id. at 188. The court also concluded that 
Peerless had a duty to defend the motel under the umbrella liability policy. See id. at 195 (explaining 
that “personal and advertising injury” damages are covered under the umbrella policy and that no 
exclusions listed in that policy barred coverage). 
 192. Complaint at 1, 3–4, Samsung Fire and Marine Ins. Co., v. UFVS Mgmt. Co., No. 2:18-
cv-04365-CDJ (E.D. Pa. Oct. 10, 2018) [hereinafter Samsung Complaint]. 
 193. Plaintiff Samsung Fire & Marine Ins. Co. (U.S. Branch)’s Memorandum of Law in 
Support of Its Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings at 1–6, Samsung, No. 2:18-cv-04365-CDJ 
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 30, 2019) [hereinafter Samsung’s Memo iso Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings]. 
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First and foremost, public policy bars coverage for the 
allegations of sex trafficking asserted in the Underlying 
Actions. Furthermore, there is no coverage for such claims 
as the Plaintiff’s claimed injuries were not the result of an 
“occurrence” as required by the Samsung Policies because 
such injuries were not an “accident,” were not fortuitous, and 
were the known and expected consequence of the Roosevelt 
Defendants’ actions. Coverage is also excluded under the 
“expected or intended” injury exclusion in the Samsung 
Policies. In addition, although the Roosevelt Defendants 
claim that the underlying Plaintiffs’ claims are for “personal 
and advertising injury,” the Underlying Actions do not 
include claims of false arrest, detention or imprisonment or 
any other type of “personal and advertising injury” as defined 
by the Samsung Policies.194 
The Samsung declaratory judgment action is still ongoing. 
In addition to Samsung, other similar declaratory judgment 
actions have emerged since Nautilus and Peerless.195 In April 2020, 
two declaratory actions were initiated by insurers in federal district 
courts in New York and Georgia in response to sex trafficking 
beneficiary liability actions filed against hotel insureds.196 
Atain Specialty Insurance Co. v. Varahi Hotel, LLC197 was filed 
in a Georgia federal district court based on an underlying action by a 
sex trafficking victim alleging beneficiary liability against Varahi 
Hotel.198 In the underlying lawsuit, the plaintiff averred that “various 
hotel managers and owners, including Varahi, were involved in and/or 
benefited from sex-trafficking at their hotels.”199 
Atain’s declaratory judgment action asserted that Varahi Hotels 
was not entitled to a defense or indemnification pursuant to various 
policy exclusions.200 Atain alleged that it “has no obligation to defend 
and/or indemnify Varahi for any liability arising out of the Underlying 
 
 194. Id. at 2. Samsung also argued that “since Roosevelt Motor Inn, Inc. is not an Insured under 
the Samsung Policies that are at issue in this lawsuit, Samsung is not obligated to defend or 
indemnify Roosevelt Motor Inn, Inc. in the Underlying Actions.” Id. 
 195. See, e.g., Atain Complaint, supra note 11, at 1; Starr Complaint, supra note 11, at 1. 
 196. Atain Complaint, supra note 11, at 1; Starr Complaint, supra note 11, at 1. 
 197. Atain Complaint, supra note 11, at 1. 
 198. Id. at 10. 
 199. Id. 
 200. See generally id. at 1. 
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Lawsuit,” as the policy’s “Physical-Sexual Abuse,” “Criminal Acts,” 
“Injury on Normally Occupied Premises,” “Knowing Violation of 
Rights of Another,” and “Known Injury or Damage” exclusions all bar 
coverage.201 Additionally, Atain alleged that the sex trafficking claims 
against Varahi did not constitute an “occurrence,” and thus were also 
precluded by an “Expected or Intended Injury” exclusion.202 The Atain 
declaratory action was settled in January 2021. 
Approximately a week after the filing of Atain, Starr Indemnity 
& Liability filed a declaratory action in a New York federal district 
court in the matter of Starr Indemnity & Liability Co. v. Choice Hotels 
International, Inc.,203 based on an underlying action by a sex 
trafficking victim alleging beneficiary liability against Choice Hotels 
and other hotel defendants.204 
In its declaratory judgment action, Starr asserted that Choice 
Hotels is not entitled to a defense or indemnity in connection with the 
underlying sex trafficking lawsuit due to the “abuse or molestation 
exclusion” in the applicable insurance policies.205 Starr’s declaratory 
judgment action is in its infancy stage and thus is still pending before 
the New York federal district court. Going forward, it will be 
interesting to see how courts rule in these declaratory judgment 
matters. In examining the policy exclusions at issue in the Nautilus 
and Peerless decisions and those at issue in the Samsung, Atain, and 
Starr Indemnity actions, there appear to be common exclusions being 
raised by insurers as the basis for their arguments that coverage is 
barred.206 Of the cases discussed, Nautilus is the only insurer that 
raised an “assault and battery exclusion” as the basis for its position 
that it did not owe a duty to defend or indemnify.207 It also argued that 
providing coverage was against Pennsylvania public policy,208 which 
insurer Samsung asserted as well in its declaratory judgment action.209 
 
 201. Id. at 13–15. 
 202. Id. at 14–15. Atain also asserted in the complaint that Varahi was not a Named Insured or 
additional Insured under the applicable policy. Id. at 11. 
 203. Starr Complaint, supra note 11, at 1. 
 204. Id. at 4. 
 205. Id. at 5. 
 206. See Complaint, Nautilus II, 781 F. App’x 57 (3d Cir. 2019) (No. 2:17-CV-04491) 
[hereinafter Nautilus Complaint]; Peerless Complaint, supra note 62, at 1; Atain Complaint, supra 
note 11, at 1; Samsung Complaint, supra note 192, at 1; Starr Complaint, supra note 11, at 1. 
 207. See Nautilus Complaint, supra note 206, at 9–10. 
 208. See id. at 11. 
 209. See Samsung’s Memo iso Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, supra note 193, at 2. 
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Other common exclusions raised in these cases included the “personal 
and advertising injury,” “criminal acts,” and “expected or intended 
injury,” as well as “physical-sexual abuse” or “abuse or molestation” 
exclusions.210 Finally, the argument that the alleged sex trafficking 
activities at the hotels are excluded from coverage because they do not 
constitute “an occurrence” under the applicable policies appears to be 
a common assertion being made by insurers.211 
So, with the myriad of exclusions being raised, the question 
arises: how will these courts and others rule on this critical coverage 
issue? Will their decisions align with the Third Circuit’s decision in 
Nautilus and conclude that applicable policy exclusions, and 
potentially public policy, bar coverage to hotels in these sex 
trafficking beneficiary liability claims, or will they hold in a manner 
similar to the Peerless court, finding that exclusions asserted by the 
insurer do not bar coverage and the insurer owes a defense, and 
potentially indemnification, to the hotel insured? 
Based on the similarity in the exclusions at issue in Samsung and 
Nautilus and the fact that the Samsung case is before the same district 
court as Nautilus, some predictions can be made as to the possible 
outcome in Samsung. Similar to the insurer in Nautilus, Samsung’s 
declaratory judgment complaint also raises a public policy argument 
as the basis for why the court should find that it does not have a duty 
to defend or indemnify the hotel insureds.212 Like Nautilus, Samsung 
argues that since the victim’s complaint alleges criminal violations of 
trafficking, Pennsylvania public policy precludes coverage.213 
Specifically, Samsung’s complaint alleges that the allegations of the 
underlying action aver that the hotel defendants “harbored, maintained 
and financially profited” from the victim’s trafficking and knowingly 
rented rooms and provided other services to persons engaged in sex 
trafficking, all in violation of the Pennsylvania Human Trafficking 
Law.214 The complaint goes on to allege that Pennsylvania’s Human 
Trafficking Law “represents a declaration of Pennsylvania public 
policy that harboring, maintaining and financially profiting from 
commercial sex trafficking is a criminal act.”215 Thus, as Nautilus 
 
 210. See sources cited supra note 206. 
 211. See Nautilus Complaint, supra note 206, at 11–12; Atain Complaint, supra note 11, at 12. 
 212. Samsung Complaint, supra note 192, at 7–8. 
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 215. Id. at 8. 
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argued, it would be against public policy for Samsung to indemnify 
the hotel insureds who have allegedly engaged in criminal conduct in 
violation of Pennsylvania’s Human Trafficking Law.216 
As discussed, the Third Circuit in its Nautilus decision did not 
address any of the public policy arguments raised by the parties.217 
Instead, it held that since the assault and battery exclusion precluded 
coverage, there was no need to address whether public policy would 
also bar coverage for the intentional torts and criminal misconduct that 
the plaintiff plead in her complaint.218 
The district court’s holding in Nautilus, however, is instructive as 
to what the Samsung court may conclude regarding Samsung’s public 
policy argument. Reasoning that it was against Pennsylvania public 
policy law to “insure against claims for intentional torts or criminal 
acts,” the district court in Nautilus held that “financially benefitting” 
from sex trafficking is a criminal offense under Pennsylvania’s 
trafficking law and thus public policy barred coverage.219 
Accordingly, because the allegations in the underlying sex trafficking 
suit against the hotel defendants in Samsung allege that they 
“financially profited” from the victim’s sex trafficking,220 it is likely 
that the Samsung court, following the district court’s holding in 
Nautilus, will also find that Pennsylvania public policy bars insurance 
coverage to the hotel insureds. 
The Peerless decision may also bear some weight on how the 
Atain court rules on the criminal acts exclusion being raised by the 
insurer and its applicability to the sex trafficking victim’s claims in the 
underlying suit. Although the Atain declaratory action is in its infancy, 
if the federal district court hearing the case ultimately aligns its 
decision with the Peerless court’s holding, Atain’s argument that 
Exclusion (d), “Criminal Acts” precludes coverage to the hotel 
insureds will likely fail. The Atain General Commercial Liability 
policy contains virtually the same provisions and exclusions that were 
at issue in Peerless.221 As was the case in Peerless, Coverage B of the 
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applicable policy, “Personal and Advertising Injury Liability,” 
provided coverage for damages caused by an offense arising out of the 
hotel insured’s business.222 However, Exclusion (d), “Criminal Acts,” 
excluded coverage for any personal injury “arising out of a criminal 
act committed by or at the direction of the insured.”223 Peerless 
attempted to rely on the criminal acts exclusion to argue that since the 
victim’s injuries were a result of the hotel managers’ criminal 
violations of the TVPA, the victim’s claims were not covered by the 
policy.224 In rejecting this argument, the Peerless court analyzed some 
of the provisions of the TVPRA and reasoned that the Act allowed a 
victim to recover civilly under § 1595(a) when the person or entity 
knew or should have known that the trafficker was in violation of the 
Act, thus allowing for liability under a negligence standard.225 Hence, 
the court found that although the victim couched her sex trafficking 
allegations against the hotel managers in language asserting that they 
committed intentional criminal misconduct, there was a possibility 
that the complaint was “‘reasonably susceptible’ to an interpretation 
finding only negligence” and that a defendant could be civilly liable 
without having committed any criminal acts under the TVPA.226 
Accordingly, the court held that the criminal acts exclusion would not 
bar coverage if the hotel insureds’ negligent conduct facilitated the sex 
trafficking.227 
Because Atain and Peerless address the same criminal acts 
exclusion, it is possible that the Atain court may rely on the Peerless 
court’s analysis to guide its decision on whether this exclusion 
precludes coverage for the hotel. If the Atain court adopts the Peerless 
court’s reasoning, Atain’s argument that Exclusion (d) bars coverage 
will likely be unsuccessful, and Atain will have to convince the court 
that some other exclusion applies in order to relinquish the duty to 
defend and indemnify the hotel insured. 
As is apparent from the sampling of cases discussed in this 
section, insurers are raising a variety of exclusions in their declaratory 
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actions.228 Coverage decisions by courts will therefore be determined 
on a case-to-case basis, examining the exclusions being asserted by 
the insurer and the factual allegations made in the underlying sex 
trafficking beneficiary liability suits against hotel insureds. If more 
courts align their rulings with the Nautilus decision and find that 
coverage is barred by applicable exclusions in these declaratory 
actions, the reality of not being afforded coverage, and paying the 
costs of defense and potentially millions of dollars in damages, will 
add a further layer of legal and financial consequences for hotels’ 
liability. This reality should incentivize hotels to implement 
preventative measures and protocols to curtail and hopefully 
ultimately end the proliferation of sex trafficking on their premises. 
C.  An Alternative to Exclusions: Other Risk Management Tools That 
Can Have a Regulatory Impact 
Even if courts decide, however, that insurers have to provide 
hotels defense and indemnification in underlying sex trafficking 
lawsuits, insurers can still serve as regulators—impacting hotel anti-
trafficking prevention efforts—by employing other risk management 
tools such as auditing, training, and educational services. 
The cyber liability insurance industry exemplifies this form of 
regulation. In the cyber liability insurance context, insurers not only 
pool and transfer an insured’s risk to the insurer and provide defense 
and indemnification, but they also provide risk management services 
that proactively impact how a corporation responds to a data breach, 
for example.229 Cybersecurity risks relate to things such as “loss 
exposure associated with the use of electronic equipment, computers, 
information technology, and virtual reality” and reflect some of the 
greatest emerging threats to corporations and consumers.230 Many 
corporations do not feel that they are adequately prepared for 
cybersecurity risks and feel like they do not properly allocate funds, 
training, or resources to protect consumers’ electronic data from 
 
 228. See sources cited supra note 206. For example, the “abuse and molestation” exclusion 
raised in the Starr declaratory judgment action was not raised by either of the insurance companies 
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privacy breaches.231 In response, cyber insurers, acting as compliance 
regulators, utilize their risk management services to help organizations 
prevent data breaches from occurring, as well as assist them in 
identifying breaches and developing proper responses if they do 
occur.232 
For example, some of the risk management or prevention services 
that cyber insurers offer include auditing cyber security practices and 
performing “cyber health checks.”233 Following these audits and 
checks, corporations are rated, and insurers offer security and privacy 
recommendations.234 “Insurers then ‘scan’ hidden risks on public-
facing infrastructures, provide a detailed view of a company’s 
vulnerability status, and prioritize vulnerabilities.”235 At this stage, the 
insurance company or a third-party vendor examines whether existing 
firewalls, web and email servers are effective and, if not, identify ways 
to alleviate any vulnerabilities.236 
In addition to assessing risk and providing auditing services, 
cyber insurers also regulate corporations’ decision-making process 
and overall corporate behavior by supplying enhanced services such 
as comprehensive written materials that advise them on how to detect 
and prevent data breaches.237 These materials can be in the form of 
“cyber news and blogs, best-practices checklists, monthly newsletters, 
articles and whitepapers . . . webinars, and legal summaries.”238 
Additionally, insurers provide corporations access to websites 
operated by the insurer that provide resources on proper training of 
staff, identification of loss exposure, and evolving compliance issues 
and laws.239 
Risk prevention tools such as those described serve an essential 
regulatory role on corporations.240 The scans and cyber health checks 
can be utilized as a precondition to determine if a corporation will be 
eligible for cyber insurance.241 Consequently, corporations who are 
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interested in securing cyber insurance become more diligent in their 
cyber practices and ensuring they have prevention tools in place.242 
This in turn, increases the likelihood that insurers will lower 
premiums.243 
In line with cyber insurers, hotel insurers should consider 
implementing similar risk management strategies to promote change 
in corporate behavior amongst hotels. For instance, hotel insurers 
could provide “auditing” services to determine what, if any, anti-
trafficking measures or protocols are in place at a hotel and assess their 
efficacy. After this assessment, insurers could work with hotels to 
make sure that proper anti-trafficking training is being presented to 
managers and staff that promotes awareness, detection, and reporting 
procedures to authorities. 
Additionally, insurers can regularly provide written materials to 
hotel insureds to support workplace training measures, such as 
newsletters, blogs, and legal updates highlighting the legal 
consequences of not implementing and maintaining proper anti-
trafficking training and prevention protocols. 
Although some hotels have voluntarily created and implemented 
initiatives to fight against sex trafficking in their establishments,244 
many have not. Insurers can therefore aide in these efforts by soliciting 
third-party vendors, including leading anti-trafficking 
organizations,245 to provide this essential training.246 Many states, in 
fact, have recently mandated that hotels provide anti-trafficking 
training.247 Thus, hotel insurers, like cyber insurers, can act as 
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compliance regulators by helping to ensure that anti-trafficking 
trainings occur and are done timely in accordance with applicable state 
laws. As an incentive for those that do have proper training and 
protocols in place, insurance carriers could consider offering premium 
reductions to hotel insureds. 
By taking these measures, insurers will be leveraging other risk 
management strategies—in addition to coverage exclusions—to 
induce hotels’ active participation in eradicating sex trafficking in the 
hotel industry. 
CONCLUSION 
Meaningful change can start with hotels committing to anti-
trafficking training measures and protocols that will help their workers 
have greater awareness of trafficking indicators and, in turn, be more 
vigilant in reporting suspicious activity. The increased potential of 
insurers taking a stance that they will not defend or indemnify hotel 
insureds faced with these claims, and the regulatory impact that that 
stance imposes, should serve as an additional catalyst for hotels to 
implement anti-trafficking measures. Even if courts find that insurers 
have to defend and indemnify hotel insureds, insurers can still serve 
as regulators by utilizing other risk management tools such as auditing, 
training, and educational services to help interdict the burgeoning sex 
trafficking problem that exists at our nation’s hotels. 
 
